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Agricultural Law
Fencing Laws in Missouri: Confusion,
Conflict, Ambiguity and
a Need for Change
CraigR. Heidemann*

I. INTRODUCTION
Missouri's fence laws are significant for several reasons. First, the State of
Missouri is second among all states in beef cattle production and in total number
of working farms.' Of Missouri's 5.3 million citizens,2 a full ten percent are
engaged in agriculture or agriculture-related occupations3 and generate $5.1
billion dollars in agricultural income and $1.38 billion dollars in export
revenues.4 Second, of Missouri's total area, thirty million acres are being used
as farm land.5 Surrounding most of these thirty million acres of farm land are
fences, most in need of repair or maintenance. These fences stand as sentinels,
guarding and restraining hundreds of thousands of head of livestock from
running free on what used to be Missouri's open range and thereby causing
unimaginable damage and inconvenience to our modem way of life.
The importance of quality fences to Missouri's farmers, ranchers and those
who drive upon the public roads often goes unnoticed until the occasional stray
wanders in front of a speeding vehicle or destroys a neighbor's crops or pasture.
When these events occur, it is up to the legal practitioner to weave through
Missouri's complex, antiquated series of fence laws and case decisions to pave
the way towards an acceptable resolution of the client's problems. However, in
the law's current state, practitioners need more than a road map to find their way
through the maze offence laws. They need the earliest volumes of the Missouri
Appeal Reports and the ability to predict how the courts ultimately will decide
upon the interaction of Missouri's four separate fence laws and upon issues that
generally have not been presented to Missouri courts in this century.

* B.A., University of Tulsa, 1991; J.D., University of Missouri-Columbia School
of Law 1994; Co-Chairman, Missouri Bar Agricultural Law Committee, 1995-1997.
1. MISSOURIDEPARTMENTOF AGRICULTURE, 1997 MISSOURI FARM FACTS 1 (Vicky
Pauley et al., eds.). Furthermore, four percent of the U.S. hog operations are in Missouri,

five percent of the U.S. farms are in Missouri, six percent of the U.S. cattle operations
are in Missouri, and seven percent of the U.S. turkeys are raised in Missouri. Id.
2. OFFICIAL MANUAL, STATE OF MISSOURI 894 (Jim Grebing, ed., 1997-1998)
[hereinafter MISSOURI OFFICIAL MANUAL].
3. See MISSOURI OFFICIAL MANUAL, supranote 2, at 896.
4. See MISSOURI OFFICIAL MANUAL, supra note 2, at 895.
5. See MISSOURI OFFICIAL MANUAL, supra note 2, at 895.
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This Article will address landowners' responsibilities arising from the
fencing requirements found in Chapters 272 and 270 of the Missouri Revised
Statutes and the historical context of those requirements. This Article also will
address the statutory and tort liability of landowners whose livestock trespasses
or runs at large and will summarize the legislative attempts to change the fencing
laws throughout the past several years. Much of the groundwork for this Article
has been laid by two preceding authors, John H. Calvert6 and Robert V.
Krueger,7 and it is with thanks to them that Missouri's otherwise unintelligible
fencing laws can be deciphered at all.
II. DEFINITIONS
Before one can embark on an analysis of Missouri's fence law, the basic
fence terminology must be set forth and defined:
1. Exterior Fence: A fence that is not situated within a common
enclosure. A fence along a public highway is an exterior fence. Also, any
fence which is not a partition fence, interior fence or a division fence.
2. PartitionFence: A fence which is erected on the boundary between
two owners of land. It may or may not be a "division" fence.
3. DivisionFence: A fence that has been divided in such a way that one
adjoining landowner has the legal obligation to maintain one "divided,"
designated portion of the fence and the other adjoining owner has the legal
obligation to maintain the remaining portion of the fence.
4. InteriorFence: A partition fence which is wholly within a common
enclosure and does not border any public road right of way.
5. Common Enclosure: Two adjoining parcels of land which are entirely
enclosed by a continuous, common fence. 8
IH. COMMON LAW RELATING TO RESTRAINING
DOMESTIC ANIMALS
Depending on which county a livestock owner lives in, and depending on
the type of fence at issue, the common law relating to restraining domestic
animals has limited application. Thus, an analysis of Missouri's fence laws must
begin with the common law. At common law, possessors of animals are under
a strict and absolute duty to restrain their animals from trespassing or wandering
onto the land of another, due to the inherent destructive qualities of most

6. John H. Calvert, Comment, FencingLaws in Missouri-RestrainingAnimals, 32

Mo. L. REV. 519 (1967).
7. Robert V. Krueger, FencingLaws in Missouri andLivestock Running at Large
on Public Roads, Mo. FARM LAW, Ch. 6 (2d ed. 1993).
8. See Krueger, supranote 7, § 6.1.
)
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animals.9 The common law doctrine requires that the owner of livestock fence
in the livestock or otherwise restrain them from running at large; adjoining
landowners are not compelled to fence out the livestock of others.' ° At common
law, absent any prescription or agreement, adjoining owners of land have
absolutely no obligation to build or maintain a partition fence on their common
boundary line with an adjoining landowner." Rather, at common law, a stock
owner is bound to keep his cattle on his own premises, whether by placing the
livestock within a fenced area or within a barn, or by tethering them to posts. 2
At common law, a rancher running five hundred head of horses cannot force his
neighbor, who only raises a few animals, to contribute towards the cost of
building and maintaining a partition fence.
At common law, land owners damaged by a trespassing animal can: (1)
eject the animal using reasonable care; 3 (2) maintain a trespass action for the
damage done by the animal; 4 or (3) "distrain the animal as security for the
resulting damage and for the cost of keeping it during the distrainment."' 5
However, if the animal trespassed through a common law division fence under
circumstances in which an agreement existed between the owners as to which
section of the fence each was to maintain, these three remedies are
inapplicable. 6
"The common law imposes no duty to restrain domestic animals from
straying upon a public highway."' 7 This issue is of particular importance, as
discussed more fully infra. 8 Prior to the twentieth century, animals caused

9. "[T]he true rule of law is that the person who, for his own purposes, brings on
his land and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must
keep it in at his peril, and that, if he does not do so, he is primafacie answerable for all
the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape. He can excuse himself by
showing that the escape was owing to the plaintiff's default, or, perhaps, that the escape
was the consequence of vis major, or the act of God ....
" Rylands v. Fletcher, 35 L.J.Ex. 154, 156 (1866) (emphasis added).
10. Haigh v. Bell, 23 S.E. 666, 667 (W. Va. 1895); See Calvertsupra note 6, at
520.

11. Calvert, supranote 6, at 522.
12. See 4 AM. JUR. 2D Animals § 59 (1995).
13. Heald v. Grier, 12 Mo. App. 556, 559 (1882); GLANVILLE WILLIAMs, LLABILrrY
FORANIMALS 90-91 (1939).
14. Calvert, supra note 6, at 521 ("Since the liability is strict, the animal owner's
exercise of due care does not constitute a defense. Thus, whether he has adequately
fenced the animal is immaterial.")
15. Calvert, supranote 6, at 521.

16. See O'Riley v. Diss, 41 Mo. App. 184, 193 (1907). In these cases, the rights
of the damaged landowner are governed by the terms of the fencing agreement. Griffin
v. Anderson, 369 S.W.2d 889, 891-92 (Mo. Ct. App. 1963).
17. Calvert, supranote 6, at 522 (extensive discussion of common law regarding
animals straying upon public roadways).
18. As discussed infranotes 60-82 regarding counties adopting the 1963 Fence Act
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1998
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travelers slight inconvenience considering the mode of conveyance and speed of
pre-twentieth century transportation. Cows, sheep, or swine on the road posed
little threat to an oncoming surrey or buckboard. 9 Accordingly, none of the
previously discussed common law options relating to trespassing animals relates
to trespasses of animals upon a public way or to animals being driven along a
highway?
Not surprisingly, the common law has never favored motorists or parties
injured or damaged in colliding with roving animals along a public highway.
Liability attaches only where the roving animal has vicious propensities 2' or
where the animal's owner knew or should have known that the animal's
presence on the highway would cause injury.2Y Contributory negligence is a
recognized defense in all motorist-animal collisions.' As noted by Calvert, only
one Missouri motorist has successfully recovered under a common law theory
after colliding with an animal on a roadway.24 In light of animal owners'
qualified right to permit animals to stray upon a public highway,25 it would seem
that a purely common law action for damages resulting from strays on the
roadway is likely to fail more often than not.26
IV. THE BIRTH OF FENCING LAW IN MIssouRi:
THE OPEN RANGE ACT
The 1808 Enclosure Act, known as the "Open Range Act," was Missouri's
first fence law and was enacted twelve years before statehood, while Missouri

as a local option, the presumption of negligence created by the Stock Law may be
abrogated by the 1963 Fence Act in counties adopting it. Accordingly, the common law
regarding domestic animals straying into roadways should apply in those counties.
19. See Calvert, supranote 6, at 522-23; see also WILLIAMS, supra note 13, at 37879.
20. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 505 (1976) ("A possession of livestock
that is being driven upon an unrestricted highway is subject to liability for their intrusion
upon land abutting on the highway if, but only if, he has failed to exercise reasonable
care to prevent them from straying or to remove them from the abutting lands upon which
they have strayed.").
21. Pelham v. Spears, 132 So. 886, 887 (Ala. 1931); Calvert, supra note 6, at 523.

22. Lins v. Boeckeler Lumber Co., 299 S.W. 150, 151-52 (Mo. Ct. App. 1927)
(motorist struck mule on busy street; mule owner held liable for common law negligence
because occurrence could have been reasonably anticipated under the circumstances).
Calvert, supra note 6, at 523.
23. Cox v. Moore, 394 S.W.2d 65, 68 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965).

24. Calvert, supranote 6, at 527 (citing Lins, 299 S.W. at 151-52).
25. Colvin v. Sutherland, 32 Mo. App. 77, 83 (1888).

26. This is a critical point for counties adopting the 1963 Fence Act by local
option.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol63/iss2/12
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was merely a U.S. territory.27 This first fence law was passed even before the
Missouri Territory adopted the English common law in 1816.28 Remnants of the
Open Range Act, though having little perceivable effect, still exist today and can
be found in Missouri Revised Statutes §§ 272.010 through 272.050. Under the
Open Range Act, landowners were required to "fence out" freely pasturing
livestock. The Act required a landowner, as an injured party, to prove that he
'
had maintained a "lawful fence"29
under the Act as a condition precedent to
maintaining an action for damages caused by trespassing livestock.3" Thus, the
Open Range Act impliedly vested livestock owners with the absolute right to
pasture livestock upon a neighboring landowner's land if the adjoining land was
not enclosed by a lawful, non-defective fence.3' While the Open Range Act is
not well suited to our level of modernization and land use today, the Act must
have made infinite sense to the inhabitants of the Missouri Territory in 1808,
considering the vast expanses of unoccupied, unclaimed land.
Under the Open Range Act, adjoining landowners had few remedies when
menaced by trespassing animals. They could eject the trespassing animals, but
were negligent per se for an ejectment that damaged an animal that trespassed
through a damaged fence or through any fence not meeting the requirements of
Section 272.020.32 If the adjoining landowner maintained a lawful fence under
Section 272.020, he could take up the trespassing stock and hold it for payment
of damages and cost of care, but only after the same animal trespassed through
the same fence twice.33 The only remedy the adjoining landowner had upon the
animal's first trespass was either to allow it to remain, or return it to the owner's
property.
The Open Range Act always had one significant limitation in its
application: it applied only to animals trespassing through exterior fences; it did
not apply to animals trespassing through division fences. 34 Animals trespassing

27. Act Oct. 27, 1808, 1 TERR. L., 197 (currently codified at Mo. REV. STAT. §§
272.010-272.050 (1994)).
28. Act Jan. 19, 1816, 1 TERR. L., 436 (currently codified at Mo. REV. STAT. §
1.010 (1994)).
29. The "lawful fence" definition from the Open Range Act survives today as an
example of the antiquity of the Act. Today, in 1998, a "lawful fence" may consist of
hedges, palisades, turf,worm fence, stone, brick, posts, railings, wire, or mesh. Mo. REv.
STAT. § 272.020 (1994).
30. State v. Prater, 109 S.W. 1047, 1048 (Mo. Ct. App. 1908); Heald v. Grier, 12
Mo. Ct. App. 556 (1882) (there is no such thing as an animal trespass on unenclosed
lands under the Open Range Act).
31. Gillespie v. Hendren, 73 S.W. 361, 362 (Mo. Ct. App. 1903) (dictum); See
Krueger, supra note 7, § 6.3.
32. Mo. REv. STAT. § 272.050 (1994). See also Woods v. Carty, 85 S.W. 124,
125-26 (Mo. Ct. App. 1905).
33. Mo. REv. STAT. § 272.030 (1994).
34. Reddick v. Newbum, 76 Mo. 423 (1882) (defendant's cows broke through an
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1998
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through division fences were covered by the common law proscription against
trespassing animals, which imposed strict liability on the animals' owner.35
Thus, the Open Range Act applied to animals trespassing outside of a common
enclosure and the common law applied inside a common enclosure.3 6 Since the
promulgation of the Open Range Act, a steady series of enactments and judicial
decisions have substantially limited the Act's scope so that, today, it effectively
applies only to nonstandard farm animals such as ratites, buffalo, ducks,
chickens, turkeys, or other undesignated domestic farm animals or fowl.37
V. THE 1869 DivisIoN FENCE ACT
Generally, "[i]n the absence of prescription or agreement, adjoining owners
of land have no-obligation under the common law to erect and maintain a fence
on their common boundary line." 38 The General Assembly enacted the Division
Fence Act in 1869 shortly after the end of the Civil War as a response to the
inherent inequities of the Open Range Act's requirement that parties desiring to
prevent animal trespass bear the burden of constructing a "lawful fence." The
Division Fence Act also was a response to the fact that the Open Range Act
applied only to exterior fences.39 Under the Division Fence Act, adjoining
landowners are required to share in the cost of constructing and maintaining a
partition fence serving to benefit both landowners.4"
The Act states that when a proposed or existing fence serves or will serve
to enclose an adjoining owner's land, the adjoining owner may be compelled to
pay for half the cost of erecting and maintaining the fence.4' The theory behind
the Division Fence Act is that if a land owner desires to erect or has erected a
fence which serves entirely to enclose the adjoining neighbor's land, then the
adjoining landowner is going to enjoy some benefit from the fence and should
therefore be required to bear some of the cost of the fence. Thus, when one

interior fence) (held that Section 272.030 only applied to exterior fences and trespasses
through interior fences were governed by common law under which owner is strictly
liable for trespassing animals).
35. See supra notes 13-16 (relating to common law for trespass).
36. Calvert, supra note 6, at 526.
37. See infra Section VI (discussing applicability of Stock Law).
38. Calvert, supra note 6, at 522. This is because, "every man's land is, in the eye

of the law, inclosed [sic] and set apart from his neighbor's ... or by an ideal invisible
boundary, existing only in the contemplation of law. . . ." 3 WILLiAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIEs *209.

39. 1869 Mo. LAws §§ 1-7 (currently codified at Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 272.060272.130 (1994)).
40. A partition fence is one which is erected on the boundary between two owners
of land. It may or may not be a "division fence." Jeffries v. Burgin, 57 Mo. 327, 329
(1874); Anderson v. Cox, 54 Iowa 578 (1880).
41. Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 272.060,272.090 (1994).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol63/iss2/12
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landowner has fenced three sides of his land, and his neighbor erects a fence
serving to complete the enclosure, the neighbor's fence is likely to benefit the
landowner, and the landowner will have to bear half its cost.42 The Division
Fence Act creates the legal obligation among adjoining landowners to pay the
cost of erection and maintenance for a designated portion of such a fence,
thereby satisfying the cost and maintenance of the entire fence. 3
Any subsequent trespass resulting from an animal owner's failure to
maintain his designated half of the division fence entitles the adjoining
landowner to double damages for the costs of repairing the fence and a lien on
the animal to enforce the right.' A significant limitation on the double-damage
remedy is that the animal must have trespassed through the section of fence that
the animal owner was required to maintain.45 If the animal trespassed through
the adjoining landowner's section of fence, the adjoining landowner is not
entitled to any recovery of damages and only may eject the animal. In any event,
an adjoining landowner may make necessary repairs to defective portions of a
division fence at the cost of his neighbor as a means of avoiding subsequent
livestock trespass. 4'
However, if adjoining landowners whose lands are
surrounded by a common enclosure elect not to construct a division fence, their
duties to each other revert to the common law mandate that they restrain their
own stock or pay damages associated with their animals' trespass.47
VI. THE CLOSED RANGE ACT OR STOCK LAW
The 1883 Closed Range Act, or Stock Law, was the Missouri General
Assembly's third significant enactment relating to landowners' liabilities for
their animals.' The Act is almost identical to the English common law rule that
animal owners are strictly liable for their animals' trespasses.
One key limitation of the Stock Law is that it does not apply to all species
of animals. Rather, the Stock Law applies only to "any animal or animals of the
species of horse, mule, ass, cattle, swine, sheep or goat [or domesticated

42. Calvert, supra note 6, at 525.
43. Matthews v. McVay, 234 S.W.2d 983 (Mo. Ct. App. 1950); Krueger, supra
note 7, § 6.3. Despite the statutorily created obligations among adjoining landowners by
the Division Fence Act, at least one Missouri court has foregone applying the Division
Fence Act and instead relied on contractual principles relating to division fences to
analyze the trial court's verdict for the plaintiffs. Griffin v. Anderson, 369 S.W.2d 889,
891-92 (Mo. Ct. App. 1963).
44. Mo. REV. STAT. § 272.110 (1994); Mackler v. Cramer, 32 Mo. App. 542, 543
(1888).
45. Hopkins v. Ott, 57 Mo. App. 292,296 (1894).
46. Mo. REv. STAT. § 272.110 (1994).
47. Jackson v. Fulton, 87 Mo. App. 228, 240 (1901).
48. Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 270.010-270.070 (1994).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1998
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'
geese],"49
although at least one Missouri court, in dictum, has disregarded the
enumerated categories and applied the Act to trespassing dogs.5" Like the Open
Range Act, the Stock Law applies only to animals trespassing through exterior,
non-division fences or enclosures. 5' The Stock Law contains no direct
requirement that an animal owner fence in his animals; rather, it requires the
owner to restrain his stock from running at large.52
The Stock Law initially was established as a local option law, but was made
applicable statewide in 1969." It preempts the Open Range Act provisions in
counties that adopted, by local option, the Stock Law prior to 1969 and applies
in all other counties as of 1969.' 4
The Stock Law prohibits livestock from running at large outside their
enclosures and provides a mechanism for restraining such animals and for
receiving compensation for taking them up.'5 If the owner and "taker-up" cannot
agree on damages or compensation for maintaining the stray animal, either party
may seek to have the circuit court determine such cost or damages.56 Of course,
the taker-up of an animal running at large obligates himself to provide adequate
care and nourishment to such livestock
and is liable for any damage caused by
57
his failure to use reasonable care.

49. Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 270.010, 270.190 (1994) (the former covering horses,
cattle, etc., and latter relating only to domestic geese).
50. State v. Marshall, 821 S.W.2d 550, 552 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991) (court referred to
the Stock Law to support the proposition that negligence in allowing dogs to run at large
can be inferred from the fact that the dogs are outside of an enclosure). Marshallis likely
a unique case, in that the court seemed to overlook the express provisions of the statute
which state that the statute applies only to a specified group of animals which does not
include dogs.
51. Mo.REv. STAT. § 270.010 (1994); Jones v. Habberman, 67 S.W. 716 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1902).
52. Mo. REv. STAT. § 270.010 (1994).
53. In 1969, the General Assembly repealed Sections 270.080 through 270.160,
which ended the Stock Law's local option status and made it applicable statewide, thus
abrogating the Open Range Act as it pertained to most farm animals. See Krueger, supra
note 7, §6.5.
54. Bowles v. Prentice, 172 S.W. 429 (Mo. Ct. App. 1915). At least one court has
overlooked the fact that the Stock Law is now applicable state-wide where the 1963
Fence Act local option provision has not been adopted. In Gusike v. Redd, the court of
appeals neglected to point out that Section 270.010 was applicable state-wide where, in
a summary judgment motion, the defendant raised the county's failure to adopt the
Closed Range Act as a local option during the period it was available. 848 S.W.2d 641,
641 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993).
55. Mo. REv. STAT. § 270.010 (1994).
56. Mo. REv. STAT. § 270.030 (1994).
57. Mo. REv. STAT. § 270.050 (1994). See also Woods v. Carty, 85 S.W. 124,
125-26 (Mo. Ct. App. 1905); Heald v. Grier 12 Mo. App. 556, 559 (1882).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol63/iss2/12
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The Stock Law and subsequent cases have created a presumption of
negligence on the part of the stock owner when animals are found running
outside of their enclosures." Section 270.010 states that a livestock owner shall
not be responsible for an accident on a public highway if such owner proves that
the livestock was outside its enclosure through no fault or negligence of the
owner. The courts have interpreted this statutory directive as codifying the
presumption of negligence against the livestock owner when his or her stock is
found to be running at large on the public highways. 9
VII. THE 1963 FENCE ACT OR "LOCAL OPTION"
The 1963 Fence Act, also referred to as the "Local Option," is the latest
substantive fence law enacted by the General Assembly.60 The 1963 Fence Act
abrogates the Open Range Act and the 1869 Division Fence Acte6 ' if a county's
voters elect, by simple majority, to adopt the 1963 Fence Act.62 An unofficial
mail and telephone survey directed to Missouri's 114 county clerks revealed that
eighteen counties have voted to adopt the 1963 Fence Act by county-wide
election as of February 7, 1998.63 These counties include: Bates, Clinton,
Daviess, Grundy, Harrison, Knox, Linn, Macon, Mercer, Newton, Putnam,
Reynolds, St. Clair, Schuyler, Scotland, Shannon, Shelby, and Sullivan.6

58. Mo. REV. STAT. § 270.010 (1994); but see Anderson v. Glascock, 271 S.W.2d

243, 247-48 (Mo. Ct. App. 1954) (while burden of proving absence of negligence is on
the stock owner, absence of language invoking negligence in jury instruction that owner
permitted horse to be on roadway is reversible error).
59. See Moss v. Bonne Terre Farming & Cattle Co., 10 S.W.2d 338, 340 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1928) (absent any statutory directive, the court of appeals created the presumption
ofnegligence on the part of the stock owner when it is proven such animals were running
at large outside their enclosures thus causing damage).
60. Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 272.210-272.370 (1994).
61. Mo. REV. STAT. § 272.370 (1994).

62. Mo. REV. STAT. § 272.360 (1994).
63. Thanks goes to my assistant, Mary Hopwood, for administering the survey and
compiling its results. A written questionnaire was sent via mail to Missouri's 114 county
commission clerks in December 1997. The questionnaire asked specifically whether each
county had adopted Missouri Revised Statutes Section 272.210, the 1963 Fence Act or
Local Option, by county-wide vote. Approximately one-half of the counties responded
to the survey via mail or telephone. The clerks of the remaining one-half of the counties
were contacted via telephone and asked for their responses to the questionnaire counties
identified by this survey include counties not identified by Krueger, supra note 7, § 6.14.
64. Caution is warranted in that some of the counties that have in fact adopted the
Local Option reported that they had not. Similarly, some counties which had not adopted
the Local Option reported that they had. At least one clerk (Shannon County) reported
that the election results were destroyed by fire in the 1970s, but believed the Local
Option to have been adopted. Practitioners are advised to make independent
determinations as to the applicability of the 1963 Fence Act in any particular county.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1998
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The 1963 Fence Act makes no reference to suspending or abrogating the
Stock Law if the Local Option is adopted by a county.65 Presumably, the Stock
Law is of no effect in the various counties which have adopted the Local
Option." No cases, were found in which a plaintiff in a local option county sued
under Chapter 270 for damages caused by roaming or trespassing stock. The
absence of decisions on this issue tends to support other authors' conclusions
that the 1963 Fence Act suspends the operation of the Stock Law.67 One
troubling aspect of the 1963 Fence Act is that its provisions do not apply in
counties with "all or partial open range. 68
The 1963 Fence Act apparently "constitutes a compromise between the
open range and closed range rules, a rejection of the 1869 division fence
concept, and a general attempt to enhance the rights of animal owners ...... 69
The 1963 Fence Act defines a lawful fence as one composed of four barbed
wires on posts not more than twelve feet apart with no stays or the equivalent
thereof.7" The barbed wire requirements of the Act are quite a step forward from
the stone, brick, turf, and hedge fences which are still allowable under the three
other fence laws.

Missouri Revised Statutes Section 51.135 (1994) requires county clerks to apprise
the revisor of statutes whether their county has adopted the 1963 Fence Act, but such
notifications are not specifically filed, retained, recorded or even documented by the
Secretary of State or the revisor of statutes because Section 51.135 contains no
requirement for such handling. Thus, counties may have officially reported local votes
to adopt the 1963 Fence Act to the revisor, but such notifications are not noted, indexed
or retained.
Many county clerks had strong reactions to being asked about their counties'
adopting the 1963 Fence Act such as, "No we have not nor will we ever." Others did not
even know it existed.
65. One authoritative commentator suggests that the 1963 Fence Act supersedes
the Stock Law. Calvert, supranote 6, at 526.
66. An extensive discussion justifying the notion that the 1963 Fence Act, where
adopted, suspends the Stock Law can be found in Calvert, supranote 6, at 532 and in
Krueger, supranote 7, §6.10. If this is true, then in 1963 Fence Act counties, a livestock
owner's only duty under Section 272.210 is to enclose his domestic animals within a
lawful fence consisting of four strands of barbed wire.
67. See Krueger, supra note 7, at § 6.10; Calvert, supra note 6, at 526.
68. Mo. REV. STAT. § 272.330.2 (1994). What this means is unintelligible. The
Open Range Act with respect to horses, sheep, goats, etc., was suspended by the Stock
Law. There is no longer open range except for nonstandard domestic animals. Thus, a
county can only have open range with respect to ratites, ducks, non-geese fowl, buffalo,
etc. One would suppose that Section 272.330.2 would make the 1963 Fence Act
inapplicable in any county with free ranging ostrich, emu or buffalo. Practically
speaking, this Section has no conceivable application.
69. Calvert, supranote 6, at 527.
70. Mo. REV. STAT. § 272.210 (1994).
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The 1963 Fence Act requires all fields or enclosures where livestock are
"kept or placed" to be enclosed by a lawful fence.7' It provides an actual damage
remedy when a trespassing animal makes an initial trespass. 72 For subsequent
trespasses, the Act allows an adjoining landowner to take up trespassing stock
and receive reasonable care and feed costs and any actual damages incurred.73
If the two parties cannot agree on the reasonable value of care and damages, the
Act provides that they can request that the associate circuit judge determine the
amounts due. Any amounts adjudged due will result in a lien upon the animals
taken up, for which a special execution may issue.74
Regarding construction and maintenance of division fences, if a need exists
for a fence by either of two adjoining landowners, both will be obligated to
contribute towards the construction and maintenance of the division fence.75
Thus, under the 1963 Fence Act, a landowner can no longer leave two
boundaries unfenced, thereby escaping the provisions of the Act, as a landowner
could do under the Stock Law; under the 1963 Fence Act, so long as the
proposed fence wholly or partially borders the land
of another, a reluctant
76
landowner can be forced to bear construction costs.
In any event, the Act provides that an adjoining landowner cannot be
compelled to pay more than one-half of the value of a four-strand barbed wire
fence, regardless of the type of fence actually constructed.77 Under the Act,
adjoining owners can agree upon the construction and maintenance of the
division fences either by voluntary agreement 8 or by the decision of courtappointed viewers or appraisers. 9 If the owners agree in writing as to which
fence portion each is to erect and maintain, and the agreement is recorded, it will

71. Mo. Rnv. STAT. § 272.220 (1994).
72. Mo. REV. STAT. § 272.230 (1994). Similar to the Stock Law, the
trespass/damage provisions of Section 272.230 only apply to "horses, cattle or other
stock" and do not appear to apply to other nonstandard domestic animals such as those
referenced above. Furthermore, it would appear that the trespass provisions only apply
to trespasses through exterior, non-division fences, but this point remains unclear in the
absence of a case decision interpreting the division fence liabilities in a local option
county. According to Calvert, "With respect to trespasses through division fences the
statute appears to grant the landowner no remedy other than a right to repair a defective
fence at the cost of the breaching party." Calvert, supranote 6, at 527-28.
73. Calvert, supranote 6, at 527-28.
74. Calvert, supranote 6, at 527-28.
75. Mo. REv. STAT. § 272.235 (1994).
76. Mo. REV. STAT. § 272.240 (1994). Of note is the fact that the partition fence
may stand wholly upon one side of the division line between two adjoining parcels, Mo.
REV. STAT. § 272.330.1 (1994), so long as the fence "borders" the adjoining parcel, Mo.

§ 272.240 (1994).
77. Mo. REV. STAT. § 272.240 (1994).
78. Mo. REV. STAT. § 272.270 (1994).
79. Mo. REV. STAT. § 272.250 (1994).

REv. STAT.
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bind "the makers, their heirs and assigns."" Oral fence agreements are
enforceable between the promisors, but such verbal agreements have been held
not to bind successors in title who had no notice of the agreement and did not
acquiesce to its provisions.8'
According to Krueger, the 1963 Fence Act is popular with a majority of
domestic livestock owners because it: (1) eliminates a landowner's double
damage recovery from livestock trespass; (2) mandates fence cost contribution
at a value equal to a four-strand barbed wire fence regardless of the actual type
of fence erected; (3) provides for procedural notices for such requested cost
contributions; Furthermore, the 1963 Fence Act is beneficial to livestock owners
in that it also: (4) enables adjoining landowners to fix their future obligations by
binding one another to maintain particular stretches of fences and recording their
written agreement; (5) eliminates stock owners' statutory liability for trespass
through division fences; and (6) limits, but does not eliminate, liability for an
animal's first trespass through exterior fences. Finally, it seems that so long as
a landowner has constructed a "lawful fence," as defined by Section 272.230, the
Stock Law's presumption of negligence in cases in which stock escape through
exterior fences is eliminated. Thus, livestock owners gain more rights and
protections across the board under the 1963 Fence Act.
VIII. FENCE CONSTRUCTION AND MAINTENANCE:
ADJOINING LANDOWNERS
Landowners' obligations to contribute to the costs of erection and
maintenance of a partition fence arises only by mutual agreement82 or upon a
final assessment by fence viewers or appraisers according to statute. One of two
fence laws determines such fence disputes not controlled by mutual, recorded
agreement. In non-local option counties, assuming no agreement between the
parties, the 1869 Division Fence Act controls. 3 Again, under the Division Fence
Act, landowners can be compelled to share in one-half the cost of constructing
a division fence only if it serves to enclose the adjacent landowner's property."
The terms of this provision are of particular interest because the provision

80. Mo. REv. STAT. § 272.270.1 (1994).
81. McNaughton v. Schaffer, 314 S.W.2d 245, 248 (Mo. Ct. App. 1958). "[A]
covenant running with the land for the erection and maintenance of fences cannot, it has
been held, be created by a stipulation in a deed poll, nor by parol agreement, nor by mere
usage; and hence the mere fact that adjoining landowners had long been accustomed
jointly to maintain a partition fence would not constitute a covenant running with the
land." Id. (citations omitted).
82. See Griffin v. Anderson, 369 S.W.2d 889, 891-92 (Mo. Ct. App. 1963);
Matthews v. McVay, 234 S.W.2d 983, 987 (Mo. Ct. App. 1950).
83. Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 272.060-272.200 (1994).
84. Mo. REV. STAT. § 272.060 (1994); Kent v. Lix, 47 Mo. App. 567 (1892); Cook
v. Cooksey, 300 S.W. 1034 (Mo. Ct. App. 1928).
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applies to all new fence construction resulting in enclosure of the adjoining land.
Without the permission of his neighbor, a landowner can construct a fence along
the common boundary line and demand one-half the value of the actual fence
construction costs from his neighbor. In order for a row crop farmer, for
example, to avoid his obligation under the Division Fence Act to bear the cost
of a neighbor's fence, he must merely keep part of his land unfenced. If
landowners cannot agree upon the reasonable value for fence construction or
which part each owner will maintain and repair, the Division Fence Act provides
that either party can apply to the court to have appraisers or reviewers
appointed.85 If the adjoining parties have not agreed upon which section of an
existing division fence will be maintained by which party, the associate circuit
judge shall appoint three householders to make the determination." If an
adjoining owner refuses to repair his section of a division fence, his neighbor can
repair the fence and collect double damages or restrain stock trespassing through
the damaged section and obtain a lien thereon.8 7 No division fence may be
removed without the consent of all owners of the fence. 88
On the other hand, in local option counties, the 1963 Fence Act requires
that owners keeping livestock enclose their fields with a lawful fence.' Again,
assuming no agreement between the parties, in local option counties, a duty upon
adjoining landowners to share in the construction and maintenance of a division
fence exists even if only one adjoining owner needs it.9 While the 1963 Fence
Act will require an unwilling landowner to shoulder half the cost of a fence, it
limits the total cost to that of a four-strand barbed wire fence, regardless of what
type of fence actually is constructed. 9' Ninety-days notice is required before a
landowner can apply to the associate circuit court for an order to proceed with
division fence construction as well as an order to receive one-half the value of
the enclosure based upon a lawful fence of four barbed wires.' Once the fence
is erected, adjacent landowners must agree upon which sections will be

85. Mo. REv. STAT. § 272.070 (1994); see McNaughton v. Schaffer, 314 S.W.2d
245, 249 (Mo. Ct. App. 1958). An appeal from the court's decision lies via Mo. REV.
STAT. § 272.130 (1994).
86. Mo. REV. STAT. § 272.090 (1994).
87. Mo. REV. STAT. § 272.110 (1994).
88. Mo. REv. STAT. § 272.120 (1994).
89. Mo. REV. STAT. § 272.220 (1994). Livestock owners are wholly responsible
for the costs of constructing all exterior, non-division, non-partition fences.
90. Mo. REv. STAT. § 272.235 (1994). Likewise, adjoining landowners can agree
that no fence is needed between their property. Mo. REV. STAT. § 272.235 (1994). There
is an exception, however, in that a farm owner may not require reimbursement from the
state or county if he erects a fence between his land and state or county owned land. 202
Op. Att'y. Gen. (1966).
91. Mo. REv. STAT. § 272.240 (1994).
92. Mo. REV. STAT. § 272.240 (1994).
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maintained by each party93 and must thereafter keep their respective portion of
the fence in good repair.94 Upon failure of a landowner to maintain his portion
of the fence, his neighbor may repair that portion at the landowner's cost.95

IX. REMEDIES FOR LIVESTOCK RUNNING AT LARGE
All four of the previously discussed fence laws provide for landowner
recovery of actual damages occasioned by a livestock owner's trespassing
animals. For counties not adopting the Local Option, a landowner's remedy for
trespass depends upon whether the animal trespassed through an exterior fence,
an interior non-division fence, or a division fence. If the animal trespassed
through an exterior fence, the remedy is found in the Open Range Act (for
nonstandard domestic animals) and in the Stock Law (for horses, swine, cattle,
etc.). Under the Stock Law, any person finding livestock running at large may
restrain and take up the animal if it escaped through an exterior fence, regardless
of whether such animal has committed a trespass or caused damage.' However,
this provision applies only to horses, mules, asses, cattle, swine, sheep, goats,
and domestic geese. Presumably, other species escaping through an exterior
fence may be taken up only upon their second escape and trespass.' The proper
notice and distrainment procedures for taking up an animal covered by the Stock
Law is set forth in Section 270.010 and is discussed in detail by Calvert98 and
Krueger.99
If the trespass is through the animal owner's portion of an interior division
fence, judicial interpretations of the Division Fence Act provide for the
possibility of money damages"°° and even injunctive relief for continuing
trespasses.' Of course, under the Division Fence Act, either of the adjoining
landowners owning a division fence may repair his neighbor's portion of such
fence if the neighbor refuses to do the repair. Thereafter, the landowner may

93. Mo. REv. STAT. §272.270 (1994). If the owners cannot agree on which section
each will maintain, the court will appoint viewers and make the determination. Mo. REV.
STAT. § 272.280 (1994).
94. Mo. REv. STAT. § 272.310 (1994).
95. Mo. REV. STAT. § 272.310 (1994).
96. Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 270.010, 270.190 (1994).
97. Mo. REV. STAT. §272.030 (1994).
98. Calvert, supranote 6, at 529-3 1.
99. Krueger, supranote 7, §§ 6.22-6.23.
100. Mo. REv. STAT. §272.060 (1994); Engle v. Ferrell, 105 S.W. 23, 23-24 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1907); Hopkins v. Ott, 57 Mo. App. 292 (1894); Mackler v. Cramer, 32 Mo.
App. 542 (1888). For an extensive discussion of trespass through interior division
fences, see Krueger, supra note 7, § 6.21.
101. Moschale v. Mock, 591 S.W.2d 415, 418 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979) (granted
injunctive relief where the livestock trespass was so frequent as to constitute a continuing
trespass).
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seek double recovery for damages resulting from the trespass by the neighbor's
livestock through the neighbor's dilapidated portion of the division fence."° The
Division Fence Act provides that in animal trespass cases, the assigned judge
shall appoint three householders to view the fence where the trespass occurred
and testify at trial as to whether the fence was a lawful fence under Section
272.020.
Because none of the enactments seems to cover trespasses through an
interior non-division fence, to successfully recover, a damaged landowner must
prove common law negligence for trespass against the livestock owner." 3 Even
though the Stock Law and the common law rules are nearly identical, the
procedural distinction between the two is of crucial importance. Courts have
refused to grant relief to aggrieved parties who plead violations of the Stock Law
when a trespass occurs through a non-division interior fence.'
For counties adopting the Local Option, the procedures and rights under the
Open Range Act and Division Fence Act have no application. Trespasses
through division fences are controlled by agreement between the landowners or
by the provisions of the 1963 Fence Act.'0 5 The landowner has no remedy of
restraining and distraining trespassing cattle. Rather, the landowner only may
repair the defective fence at the cost of the breaching party.0 6 In other words,
a request for damage recovery brought under Section 272.310, when damage is
caused by livestock trespassing through a division fence, apparently has no legal
merit. In local option counties, a fence divided according to the statutory process
is analogous
to an "open range" between the land of such adjoining property
10 7
owners.

In cases of trespasses through non-division exterior fences in local option
counties, a practitioner has no choice but to wade into the mire of confusion and
conflict between the Stock Law, arguably suspended in local option counties,

102. Mo. REV. STAT. § 272.110 (1994). One commentator has suggested that
Section 272.110 only permits double damages for the cost of fence repair and not a
doubling of damages from livestock trespass through a defective half of a division fence.
Krueger, supra note 7, § 6.21. No Missouri cases have ever allowed double damages
although the statute expressly provides for such.
103. Krueger, supranote 7, § 6.21; Barnard v. Weaver, 224 S.W. 152 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1920); Gillespie v. Hendren, 73 S.W. 361 (Mo. Ct. App. 1903); O'Riley v. Diss,
41 Mo. App. 184 (1890); Reddick v. Newbum, 76 Mo. 423,425 (1882).
104. In Jackson v. Fulton, 87 Mo. App. 228 (1901) and Jones v. Habberman,67
S.W. 716 (Mo. Ct. App. 1902), the losing parties tried their cases under the Stock Law
where the trespass occurred through an interior non-division fence. The courts
recognized a valid complaint on a common law theory but refused to grant relief because
this theory was either abandoned or not asserted at trial.
105. Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 272.210-272.370 (1994); See also Krueger, supra note 7,
§ 6.24.
106. Calvert, supranote 6, at 527-28.
107. Krueger, supra note 7, § 6.24; Calvert, supranote 6, at 537.
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and the 1963 Fence Act Under the Stock Law, a party may take up the animal
as security for costs and damages, while under the 1963 Fence Act, the party is
entitled to damages and costs of care but cannot take up the animal as security
for damages.'
X. MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENTS DUE TO
LIVESTOCK ON PUBLIC ROADS
Much has been published on the issue of motor vehicle collisions with
livestock running at large on public roadways. 0 9 Suits for such collisions can
be prefaced upon common law negligence"0 or upon the Stock Law."' While
one may maintain a common law negligence suit against the owner of an animal
to recover for injuries sustained in a collision," 2 the more prudent course is to
maintain suit under the Stock Law statute, to the extent that it has not been
superseded by a county's election under the 1963 Fence Act."' Suing under the
Stock Law places the burden of proving the absence of negligence upon the
landowner when his animal is present on a roadway and is the proximate cause
of the plaintiff's damages." 4 Proving violation of the Stock Law is analogous

108. See Krueger, supranote 7, § 6.24.
109. See W.M., Annotation, Liabilityfor Damages to Vehicle orPerson Riding
Therein by Animal at Large in Street or Highway, 45 A.L.R. 505 (1926); R.P.D.,
Annotation, Liabilityfor Damages to Vehicle or Person Riding Therein by Animal at
Large in Street orHighway, 140 A.L.R. 742 (1942); M.O., Regensteiner, Annotation,
Owner'sLiability, UnderLegislation ForbiddingDomestic Animals to Run at Large on
Highway, as Dependent on Negligence, 34 A.L.R.2d 1285 (1954); James L. Rigelhaupt,
Jr., Annotation, Liability of Owner ofAnimal for Damages to Motor Vehicle orInjury
to Person Riding Therein Resultingfrom Collision with DomesticAnimal at Large in
Street or Highway, 29 A.L.R.4th 431 (1984).
110. Lins v. Boeckeler Lumber Co., 299 S.W. 150 (Mo. Ct. App. 1927).
111. Claas v. Miller, 806 S.W.2d 141, 145 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991); Beeny v. Shaper,
798 S.W.2d 162, 162-63 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990); Beshore v. Gretzinger, 641 S.W.2d 858
(Mo. Ct. App 1982); Scherffius v. Orr, 442 S.W.2d 120, 123-24 (Mo. Ct. App. 1969);
Cox v. Moore, 394 S.W.2d 65, 67-68 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965); Keefer v. Hartzler, 351
S.W.2d 479,480-81 (Mo. Ct. App. 1961); King v. Furry, 317 S.W.2d 690 (Mo. Ct. App.
1958); Anderson v. Glascock, 271 S.W.2d 243 (Mo. Ct. App. 1954); Carr v. Threlkeld,
31 S.W.2d 592 (Mo. Ct. App. 1930); Moss v. Bonne Terre Farming & Cattle Co., 10
S.W.2d 338 (Mo. Ct. App. 1928); see also Moschale v. Mock, 591 S.W.2d 415 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1979) (suit for injunction based on Chapter 270).
112. Gustke v. Redd, 848 S.W.2d 641, 642 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993); Anderson v.
Glascock, 271 S.W.2d 243,246 (Mo. Ct. App. 1954) (citing Lins v. Boeckeler Lumber
Co., 299 S.W. 150 (Mo. Ct. App. 1927)).
113. Calvert, supra note 6, at 541; Krueger, supra note 7, § 6.32.
114. See Cox v. Moore, 394 SW.2d 65,68 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965); Keefer v. Hartzler,
351 S.W.2d 479,480-81 (Mo. Ct. App. 1961); King v. Furry, 317 S.W.2d 690, 696 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1958); Anderson v. Glascock, 271 S.W.2d 243,247-48 (Mo. Ct. App. 1954).
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to res ipsa loquitur with respect to making a case of primary negligence in that
the mere presence of an unattended animal on the highway is sufficient for a
prima facie case."'
In counties not adopting the Local Option, the Stock Law forms the basis
for a cause of action. Since the Stock Law is applicable state-wide, courts
should no longer require that a plaintiff bringing an action for motor vehicle
damages plead and prove that the Stock Law is in effect in the county in which
the accident occurred.' 6 For damages cases in non-local option counties, a
plaintiff must plead and prove: (1) defendant owned the offending animal; (2)
the animal was at large outside its enclosure on the highway at the time of the
accident; and (3) the motorist was thereby damaged by the animal." 7
In counties adopting the Local Option, animal owners' liability for damages
caused by their animals running on the road may be substantially diminished,
perhaps even completely abrogated, by the fact that the 1963 Fence Act may
effectively have suspended the Stock Law. There are no cases from local option
counties passing on this issue. If courts interpret the 1963 Fence Act in such a
way that the local option counties are not subject to the Stock Law, then the
elements necessary to sustain a cause of action for a motor vehicle collision in
a local option county will not be the same as those required in non-local option
counties. The presumption of negligence will evaporate and plaintiffs will be
left with a common law cause of action."' As discussed above, the common law
has never favored motorists in animal collision cases, and an injured party bears
the burden of establishing that the animal owner reasonably should have known
that the animal would injure the aggrieved party.
Most likely, in local option counties, injured plaintiffs must look to
common law negligence cases for guidance. The only authority available for
guidance in bringing such common law negligence claims is Lins v. Boeckeler
Lumber Co." 9 According to Lins, a plaintiff must plead and prove: (1) the
character of the public road or highway; (2) the allowable speed on the public
roadway or highway; (3) the time of day; and (4) other attendant circumstances

115. Cox, 394 S.W.2d at 68.
116. But see Gustke v. Redd, 848 S.W.2d 641 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993); Claas v.
Miller, 806 S.W.2d 141 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991); Beshore v. Gretzinger, 641 S.W.2d 858
(Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (each requiring plaintiff to plead and prove applicability of Stock
Law although it was enacted state-wide for several years). As noted by Krueger, "Such
proof requirement that the Stock Law is applicable so many years after is statewide
enactment and application makes this writer question whether the courts were cognizant
and aware of the implied abrogation issue [with respect to local option counties] during
their review [and thus] . . . distinguishing between two possible causes of action."
Krueger, supra note 7, § 6.38.
117. Claas, 806 S.W.2d at 145 (citing Beshore, 641 S.W.2d at 862). But see
Scherffius v. Orr, 442 S.W.2d 120, 123-24 (Mo. Ct. App. 1969).
118. See, e.g., Scherffius, 442 S.W.2d at 123-24.

119. 299 S.W. 150 (Mo. Ct. App. 1927).
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that should have led the livestock owner to anticipate injury would result from
the animal's presence on the public road or highway. 20
Regardless of the county in which such a suit is brought, the defense is the
same: that the animal causing the injury was outside the enclosure through no
fault or negligence of the owner.' Comparative fault also is a viable defense
in a suit arising out of a collision with an animal on a roadway." Other
defenses available to the stock owner may include: (1) exercise of due care by
the animal owner, (2) that the offending species of animal is not encompassed
by the Stock Law, (3) act of God or independent cause; and (4) contributory
negligence."
XI. PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE CHANGES' 24
An analysis of legislation proposed since 1989 discloses that no less than
nine bills have been introduced which, in one form or another, seek to repeal the
present provisions of Chapter 272 and replace them in whole or part.' 25 Not one
of them ever came close to seeing the governor's desk. Most of the bills
introduced attempted to blend the provisions of the Open Range Act and the
Division Fence Act, making each of them more equitable in light of competing
stock versus crop land uses. Some of the bills introduced attempted to make the
1963 Fence Act, in part, applicable state-wide. Others attempted to create a
second, more compromising Local Option fence law. Still others attempted to
stiffen the penalties for animals trespassing through division fences.
None of the bills purported to resolve the many ambiguities and
uncertainties identified herein regarding the continued applicability or viability
of the Open Range Act as to nonstandard domestic animals, the applicability of
the Stock Law to nonstandard domestic animals, the applicability of the Stock
Law in counties having adopted the 1963 Local Option, or whether the

120. Lins v. Boeckeler Lumber Co., 299 S.W. 150 (Mo. Ct. App. 1927).
Remember that at common law, it was not negligent for an animal owner to allow his
stock to roam on the roadway. See supranotes 17-26 and accompanying text.
121. Lins, 299 S.W.2d at 150.
122. Cox v. Moore, 394 S.W.2d 65, 68, 70 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965) (holding that
where evidence supported submitting contributory negligence instruction regarding
failure to keep a careful lookout, failure to submit was prejudicial error).
123. For a detailed discussion of these defenses, see Krueger, supra note 7, § 6.35.
124. Thanks is extended to Tom Crawford, J.D., University of Missouri-Columbia,
1994 and Co-Chairman of the Missouri Bar Agricultural Law Committee 1995-1997,
for researching and compiling the introduced, but failing, fence legislation and for
assisting in its analysis.
125. H.B. 50, 89th Gen. Ass. (Mo. 1997); H.B. 1175, 88th Gen. Ass. (Mo. 1996);
H.B. 481, 88th Gen. Ass. (Mo. 1995); H.B. 26, 87th Gen. Ass. (Mo. 1992); H.B. 331,
86th Gen. Ass. (Mo. 1991); H.B. 925, 86th Gen. Ass. (Mo. 1991); H.B. 1654, 85th Gen.
Ass. (Mo. 1990); H.B. 606, 85th Gen. Ass. (Mo. 1989).
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presumption of negligence created by the Stock Law applies in counties that
adopted the 1963 Local Option. With few exceptions, the bills represent poorly
planned legislation designed to benefit some special, local interest of the
introducing legislator's constituents.
Counties adopting the 1963 Fence Act have made a conscious choice to
enact a fairly progressive, relatively simple, fair and equitable fence law. It
seems a shame that the General Assembly did not put a conditional repealer into
the legislation stating that the provisions of Chapter 270 are inapplicable in local
option counties. One is needed. Whether the General Assembly needs to amend
the 1963 Fence Act to include the burden shifting negligence presumption found
in the Stock Law is a question for the General Assembly. However, in light of
the deference given by the 1963 Fence Act to the rights of animal owners, the
burden-shifting presumption may not be necessary.
The language of the Stock Law specifically limits its application to certain
species of animals. At the time of its enactment, the General Assembly probably
did not foresee the re-emergence of domestic buffalo and white tail deer or the
introduction of ostriches, emus, llamas, and a host of other exotic animals now
seen along Missouri's roadways. At best, the obligations and liabilities of the
owners of such animals are unclear. Presently, it appears owners of such
animals can allow them to roam free as if on the open range. Surely this was not
the intent of the General Assembly, although it seems to be the present result.
Thus, clarification and revision is required. The Stock Law should be amended
to include most types of farm livestock, with few exclusions.
Finally, absent sweeping legislative change, counties can best serve their
interests by placing the Local Option on their ballots and allowing their residents
to decide whether they will be subject to fence laws created when Missouri was
a primarily unmotorized, rural territory or nascent state, or whether they will be
subject to fence laws created more recently by legislators with a view of land
rights and varying land uses better suited to modem Missouri. Not surprisingly,
many Missourians are unaware that they have a choice.
Agriculture is a key component of Missouri's economy, and fencing
choices should be made with care. Few faults can be found with the 1963 Fence
Act, other than that it did not put the final nails into the coffins of the Open
Range Act and the Stock Law. These antiquated enactments finally should be
laid to rest, at least in those counties electing to move into the future. For the
remaining counties not adopting the Local Option, caveat emptor.
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